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Abstract 
Low voter turnout has become a serious problem in most democracies, not only in the United 
States but also in many West European countries – and even in a traditionally high-turnout 
country like Austria where turnout has also been declining in recent years. There are five 
reasons why we should be concerned about this problem: 1. Low turnout means low 
participation by less privileged citizens, who are already at a disadvantage in terms of other 
forms of political participation. 2. Unequal participation means unequal influence. 3. Actual 
turnout tends to be lower than the official turnout figures suggest. 4. Turnout in elections other 
than those at the national level tends to be particularly low. 5. Turnout is declining in most 
countries. The problem of low and unequal turnout can be solved by a number of institutional 
mechanisms such as proportional representation, concurrent and infrequent elections, 
weekend instead of weekday voting, and compulsory voting. The last of these  – mandatory 
voting – is especially strong and effective, and also morally justified. 
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1. Introduction 
The subject of my lecture today is a subject about which I have become increasingly 
concerned and worried in recent years. Democracy entails, as a minimum requirement, that all 
citizens have the right to vote, and those who fought for the establishment of democracy and 
universal suffrage assumed that everyone, or almost everyone, who had the right to vote would 
make use of this precious democratic right. The reality of democracy has been otherwise: large 
numbers of citizens fail to participate in this most basic democratic process. 
I have lectured on this problem and on how the problem can be solved  – with a special 
emphasis on the merits of introducing compulsory or mandatory voting (Wahlpflicht) – both in 
the United States, my adopted country, and in the Netherlands, my native country (see Lijphart 
1995; Lijphart 1997; the latter publication contains an extensive list of references). Low turnout 
in elections has long been a big problem in the United States, but many American and 
European observers have tended to believe that this was an exclusive American concern, and 
not much of a reason for worry in the European democracies. However, it has become a 
considerable problem in some European countries as well. The Netherlands can serve as a 
good example: voter turnout has fallen dramatically after – and as a result of – the abolition of 
compulsory voting in 1970. When I grew up in Holland, voter participation in elections at all 
levels – national, provincial, and local – was almost always well above 90 percent; now it is 
much lower at all levels, with a nadir of only 36 percent in the 1994 European elections. 
It may seem like the proverbial “carrying coals to Newcastle” to lecture on this topic in Austria. 
In the last two elections of  the  Nationalrat, in 1994 and 1995, turnout was 82.5 and 86.0 
percent respectively  – percentages that are quite respectable by international standards. 
Moreover, Austrians do not have to be reminded of the possibility of mandatory voting: until 
1992, the Länder had the right to impose this obligation and four of them (Tirol, Vorarlberg, 
Steiermark, and Kärnten) actually did so for longer or shorter periods of time. On the other 
hand, all elections before the 1990s, from 1945 on, had voter turnouts of more than 90 percent. 
In the 1940s and 1950s, the average turnout level was higher than 95 percent. This means that, 
in the thirty years from 1960 to 1990, turnout levels have gone down by about 10 percentage 
points, or  – to use a different perspective  – there are now about three times as many non-
voters as there used to be. In any case, while the problem does not yet seem urgent in Austria, 
I would urge my fellow-democrats in Austria to think about the problem, and to take appropriate 
action, before it becomes truly urgent. 
The turnout problem is part of a more general democratic dilemma, namely the conflict 
between two basic democratic ideals: political participation and political equality. Participation 
and equality are not incompatible in principle, but, in practice, as political scientists have 
known for long time, participation is highly unequal. It is systematically biased in favor of 
privileged citizens (those with better education, higher incomes, and greater wealth) and it is 2 — Arend Lijphart / The Problem of Low and Unequal Voter Turnout — I H S 
biased against less privileged citizens. This systematic inequality is a serious problem 
because unequal participation spells unequal political influence. The inequality is especially 
strong for the more intensive forms of participation (like working in election campaigns, 
contacting g overnment officials, giving money to parties and candidates, and taking part in 
demonstrations): the fewer people participate, the greater the inequality. But it is also true for 
voting, especially, as I have already emphasized, in the United States, but n ot only in the 
United States. 
It is interesting to note that, around the turn of the century, when Western democracies 
adopted universal suffrage, it was generally assumed that the better educated (and more well-
to-do) would make the “rational choice” to abstain from voting, because they would realize how 
little influence one vote would have in a mass election. But empirical work, already done in the 
1920s, showed that it was the other way around: it is the less educated and poorer people who 
tend not to vote (Arneson 1925). 
Can this democratic dilemma of unequal participation be solved? This is difficult, if not 
impossible, for the more intensive forms of participation. But there is a partial solution: make 
the most basic form of participation, namely voting, as equal as possible – both as an end in 
itself and also to provide a democratic counterweight to the inequality of other forms of 
participation. The obvious way to do this is to maximize voter turnout. Our democratic goal 
should be not just universal suffrage, but universal, or near-universal turnout. 
We know a great deal about the institutional mechanisms that can improve turnout. There are a 
lot of excellent studies of this subject by political scientists – from the 1920s and 1930s to the 
1980s and 1990s. I am thinking especially of the comparative analyses of the American 
political scientist Harold Gosnell (1930) and of the Swedish political scientist Herbert Tingsten 
(1937) in the early period, and of the recent work of Bingham Powell (1980; 1986), R obert 
Jackman (1987), and Mark Franklin (1996); the last three all live and work in the United States, 
but Jackman is a new Zealander and Franklin an Englishman. These studies show that easy 
and voter-friendly registration rules, proportional representation, weekend voting instead of 
weekday voting, and compulsory voting can all be very effective in raising turnout. Of all of 
these, compulsory or mandatory voting is especially effective – in spite of the low penalties that 
are imposed for failing to vote (usually similar to a fine for a parking violation), in spite of lax 
enforcement (usually much less stringent than parking rules are enforced), and in spite of the 
secret ballot, which means that an actual vote cannot be compelled in the first place. In fact, 
both the English term “compulsory voting” and the German term Wahlpflicht are misnomers: all 
that can be required in practice is that citizens show up at the polls. In the Netherlands, 
compulsory voting was very effective in spite of the fact that citizens had the right to refuse to 
accept a ballot when they arrived at the polling station; very few people made use of this right! 
Countries that currently have compulsory voting are Australia, Italy, Greece, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, and most of the Latin American democracies. I H S — Arend Lijphart / The Problem of Low and Unequal Voter Turnout — 3 
 
2. Five Reasons for Concern 
Before turning to the various institutional mechanisms, including mandatory voting, let me first 
try to convince you in somewhat greater detail why low voter turnout is such a serious problem 
– a big problem that we should really be worried about, and a big problem for which we should 
try to find a solution. There are five reasons to be concerned: 
1.  First, low voter turnout means unequal and socio-economically biased turnout. This is an 
especially strong pattern in the United States, where voter participation is extremely low 
compared with most other countries. In fact, the U.S. is sometimes depicted as unique in 
this respect, but there is massive evidence that it is also a problem in higher-turnout 
countries. For instance, Powell (1986, 27–28) combined data for seven European nations 
(including Austria) and Canada and found a consistent effect of the level of education on 
turnout: a difference of 10 percentage points between the lowest and highest of five 
education levels and a consistent increase of 2 to 3 percentage points at each higher level. 
Another good illustration is the increase in class bias in the first election after the abolition 
of mandatory voting in the Netherlands in 1970: for five educational groups, the turnout rate 
was about 70 percent for the lowest two groups but 87 percent for the highest group. 
Compared with these unequal turnouts, the last parliamentary election still conducted under 
compulsory voting, in 1967, showed turnouts for all groups above 90 percent. But even here 
there was still a slight class bias: turnouts increased gradually from 93 percent in the 
lowest educational group to about 97 percent in the two groups with the most education 
(Verba, Nie, and Kim, 1978, 7; Irwin 1974). This shows how strong and persistent the class 
bias is, but also that the differences are minimized at very high turnout levels. 
2.  The second reason for worry is that who votes, and who doesn’t, has important 
consequences for who gets elected and for public policies. Political scientists have found 
clear connections, not only between socio-economic status and turnout, but also between 
socio-economic status, party choice, and the outcome of elections, and between types of 
parties (parties of the left versus parties o f the right) and progressive versus conservative 
policies that these parties pursue when they are in office. Some doubts have been raised 
about these connections by surveys, mainly in the United States, showing that non-voters 
are not all that different from voters with regard to policy preferences and partisan 
preferences (Teixeira 1992, 97–101). I think that the main explanation of these findings is 
the following: when you ask non-voters how they would have voted, you’re asking a question 
of people who have not been politically mobilized – and who, if you pardon the old-fashioned 
expression, have not developed enough “class consciousness.” To discover their true 
preferences, what is needed is not questions in the usual surveys, but something like the 
“deliberative opinion poll,” proposed by James Fishkin (1991), or what Robert Dahl (1989, 
340) calls a “mini-populus”: a randomly selected group of people who deliberate together 
over an extended period of time. 4 — Arend Lijphart / The Problem of Low and Unequal Voter Turnout — I H S 
The strongest evidence of direct link between turnout and support for left parties is a study 
by Alexander Pacek and Benjamin Radcliff (1995). They studied all elections from 1950 to 
1990 in 19 industrial democracies. And they found that the left share of vote went up by 
almost one-third of a percentage point for every percentage point increase in turnout. 
3.  The turnout percentages that are usually quoted are based on the actual voters as a 
percentage of all registered voters. Because voter registration is far from completely 
accurate in many countries, the turnout percentages are often also inaccurate  – and 
generally higher than the true turnout. The best way to solve this problem is to measure 
turnout as a percent of the voting-age population instead of as a percent of registered 
voters. The one disadvantage of this procedure is that the voting-age population also 
includes non-citizens. The consensus among the experts, however, is that the use of the 
voting-age population is still the better choice  – and the only acceptable measure for 
comparing turnout levels in different countries. It was used by the International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (1997) in Stockholm in its recent world-wide study of 
voter turnout. According to this measure, turnout in the last three Nationalrat elections in 
Austria was 80.5, 76.0, and 78.6 percent, instead of the official turnout figures of 86.1, 82.5, 
and 86.0 percent – roughly 6 to 7 percentage points lower than the official figures. 
Powell (1980) already used this measure in his earlier and very well-known study of turnout 
in 30 democracies in the 1960s and 1970s  – all of the democratic countries with 
populations over one million during this period. His figure for Austria is 89 percent, 
considerably higher than the median of only 76 percent among all 30 countries. The median 
of 76 percent means that in half of the countries fewer than about three of every four citizens 
turned out to vote. It is also worth pointing out that most of the larger countries were below 
the median: not just the United States, but also India, Japan, Great Britain and France. 
4.  These turnout figures are still deceptively favorable because they are the figures for national-
level parliamentary or presidential elections. Political scientists often call these elections 
“first-order elections.” These are the most salient and hence the highest-turnout elections. 
But the vast majority of elections are second-order elections: they are lower-salience and 
hence lower-turnout elections. In the United States, only presidential elections get turnouts 
higher than 50 percent; turnout in midterm congressional elections has averaged only about 
35 percent in recent years; local turnout has only been about 25 percent. Low turnout is 
typical for lower-level elections in other countries, too: local turnout in Britain is only about 
40 percent. It is even lower in Australia (where there is no mandatory voting at the local 
level): about 35 percent (Goldsmith and Newton 1986). In European Parliament elections 
(which are also second-order elections), the average turnout in the 12 member countries in 
1994 was only 58 percent – and it was only about 36 percent in Britain, Portugal, and the 
Netherlands. Here again, Austrian voters are still well above the average: turnout in the first 
European Parliament election in Austria almost exactly a year ago was almost 68 percent. I H S — Arend Lijphart / The Problem of Low and Unequal Voter Turnout — 5 
 
What we must remember is that second-order elections may be the  less important 
elections, but that they are not unimportant elections. 
5.  Finally, voter turnout is not only low but also declining. This is a well-known and undisputed 
fact in the United States, but a more controversial question in other democracies. I read the 
comparative evidence as indicating a generally declining trend. One example is Russell 
Dalton’s (1996, 44–45) comparison of the 1950s with the 1990s in 20 democracies: he finds 
an average decline of 5 percentage points – and 17 of the 20 countries with lower turnout in 
the 1990s as against only 3 countries with higher turnout. The same conclusion emerges 
from a recent study for the European Science Foundation (Borg 1995; Topf 1995). This 
decline is especially disturbing because levels of education and prosperity (factors that can 
be expected to increase turnout) have been going up dramatically in Europe, as they have 
in the United States. 
In the United States, Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward (1988, 869) have argued that 
burdensome registration requirements discriminate against less privileged citizens – and that 
they should be regarded as the functional equivalent of earlier property and literacy 
qualifications. Similarly, I would argue that the empirical link between turnout and inequality is 
the functional equivalent of these same property and literacy qualifications, and also of the 
plural voting scheme proposed by John Stuart Mill (1861). Mill wanted to give extra votes to the 
better-educated citizens – who are also the more well-to-do citizens. Both of these are now 
universally rejected as undemocratic. My question then is: why do we tolerate the functional 
equivalent of such rules? 6 — Arend Lijphart / The Problem of Low and Unequal Voter Turnout — I H S 
3. Potential Remedies 
Let me now turn to possible remedies. Voting participation depends on many factors, including 
the salience of the issues – one example is the 93 percent turnout in the 1995 independence 
referendum in Quebec – the attractiveness of parties and candidates, and political culture and 
attitudes. However, when we look for remedies for non-voting, the institutional mechanisms are 
especially important because they are more amenable to political engineering than the other 
factors. 
First of all, American political scientists have paid a lot of attention to the effect of burdensome 
registration requirements; these are estimated to depress turnout by about 8 to 14 percentage 
points (Teixeira 1992, 122). This means that automatic or same-day registration could increase 
turnout by this amount. But this is only a partial remedy for the U.S.: it would still leave the 
U.S. well below the median turnout of other democracies. And it would leave turnout in second-
order elections in the U.S. well below 50 percent. In most other Western democracies, voter 
registration is not a major problem because it is automatic or the government’s responsibility – 
and registration reform is therefore not a relevant concern. 
The electoral system makes a big difference: p roportional representation (PR) tends to 
increase turnout by 9 to 12 percentage points (Blais and Carty 1990). The reasons are that 
voters have more choices, that there is less of a wasted-vote problem, and, most important, 
that parties have stronger incentives to mobilize voters in areas where they are weak. But the 
finding of high turnout in PR countries is based entirely on first-order elections. The picture is 
much less favorable for second-order elections. I have already mentioned the low turnout in 
European Parliament elections – in spite of PR. In 1994, 11 of the 12 member countries used 
PR. The 1995 provincial elections in the Netherlands – also conducted by PR – had only 50 
percent turnout. In the 1996 school board elections in New York City – one of the few examples 
of PR in the United States – turnout was just 5 percent! 
Turnout is seriously depressed by having very frequent elections. Richard Boyd (1981; 1989) 
has demonstrated this effect for the United States, where, on average, citizens are called to 
the polls 2 to 3 times per year. This factor can also account for the low turnout in Switzerland, 
where there are 6 to 7 voting days per year. The theoretical explanation is clear. Turnout is a 
collective-action problem: representative democracy is a collective good that requires people to 
vote and elect representatives, but each individual vote has only a minute chance to affect the 
outcome of an election, and costs some time and energy; hence it does not make rational, 
self-interested, sense for each individual to vote. Obviously, frequent elections increase the 
cost of voting a great deal. 
According to this same explanation, concurrent elections should help turnout, especially in 
second-order elections when these are combined with first-order elections. The evidence we I H S — Arend Lijphart / The Problem of Low and Unequal Voter Turnout — 7 
 
have shows that this is indeed the case, both in the U.S. and in Europe. For instance, turnout 
in European Parliament elections have been much higher if they are held at the same time as 
national parliamentary elections (Niedermayer 1990). 
Franklin (1996, 226–30) has found that weekend voting (instead of weekday voting) and also 
the availability of mail ballots can help. In fact, these have a surprisingly large impact: together 
they are worth about 10 percentage points. 8 — Arend Lijphart / The Problem of Low and Unequal Voter Turnout — I H S 
4. Mandatory Voting 
Finally, let us take a closer look at compulsory voting. All of the studies that I have mentioned 
earlier (from Gosnell and Tingsten to those by Powell, Jackman, and Franklin) have been 
impressed with the high turnout in countries with mandatory voting: it adds from 10 to 16 
percentage points to turnout. Further work by Wolfgang Hirczy (1994) shows that mandatory 
voting is especially effective in what would otherwise be very low-turnout situations. For 
instance, the last Australian election before compulsory voting, in 1922, had a turnout of only 
55 percent; the next one, with compulsory voting, had a turnout of 90 percent – a boost of 35 
percentage points. When mandatory voting was abolished in Venezuela in 1993, turnout in the 
presidential elections fell 30 percent, from 90 to 60 percent (Molina Vega 1995, 164). 
The pattern is the same for second-order elections, which tend to be low-turnout elections: We 
find very high turnout in Belgium and Italy in local elections and also in European Parliament 
elections with mandatory voting. The turnout in Dutch local and provincial elections was above 
90 percent under compulsory voting, but dropped under voluntary voting to 50 percent in the 
1995 provincial elections. In the four European Parliament elections held so far (from 1979 to 
1994), the four countries with mandatory voting had an average turnout of 84 percent; the eight 
countries with voluntary voting had an average of 46 percent – a big difference of 38 percentage 
points. 
The conclusion I draw is that, if we want to have high turnout in all elections, including second-
order elections, we should make use of all of the above turnout-enhancing devices: automatic 
registration, proportional representation, infrequent elections, weekend voting, concurrent 
elections, and mandatory voting. Austria and many other continental European countries are 
already using all of these with the exception of concurrent elections and compulsory voting. It 
is therefore especially important to consider these two possibilities. 
It is somewhat of a surprise that mandatory voting is so effective  – in spite of the fact that 
penalties for non-voting are not severe and that they are difficult to enforce because of the large 
numbers involved; for instance, with a high turnout of say 95 percent in a country with 10 
million eligible voters, there would still be half a million non-voters, and half a million people 
would have to be fined or at least investigated  – something that is obviously not practically 
possible. The theoretical explanation for the effectiveness of mandatory voting is, as I 
mentioned earlier, that turnout is a collective-action problem but one that is rather unusual in 
the sense that the cost of voting is relatively low – much lower than the costs of most other 
collective actions. Because the cost of voting is relatively low, it is a barrier that can be 
surmounted relatively easily. 
Collective-action theory also provides the basic moral justification for mandatory voting: as 
pointed out in two important articles, published more than 20 years ago, by Malcolm Feeley I H S — Arend Lijphart / The Problem of Low and Unequal Voter Turnout — 9 
 
(1974) and Alan Wertheimer (1975), the general remedy for collective-action problems is to 
counteract free riding by means of legal sanctions and enforcement. For the collective-action 
problem of turnout, this means that citizens should not be allowed to be free riders, and that 
voting should therefore be a legal obligation. 
The biggest advantage of compulsory voting is its contribution to high and relatively equal voter 
turnout. Three additional, more speculative, advantages can be cited: 
First, the increase in voting participation may stimulate stronger participation and interest in 
other political activities: people who participate in politics in one way are likely to do so in 
another (Berelson and Steiner 1964, 422). There is also considerable evidence of a spillover 
effect from participation in the workplace, churches, and voluntary organizations to political 
participation (e.g., Almond and Verba 1963, 300–74). 
Second, mandatory voting can reduce the role of money in politics, because it is no longer 
necessary to spend much money on getting voters to the polls. 
Third, mandatory voting may also discourage so-called attack advertising – and may therefore 
lessen the political cynicism and distrust that it arouses. Attack advertising works mainly by 
selectively depressing turnout among those not likely to vote for the attacker (Ansolabehere 
and Iyengar 1995). When almost everybody votes, such negative tactics are no longer worth 
using. 
Let me also take a quick look at the most important arguments against mandatory voting: 
First there is the frequently cited Weimar precedent. It suggests that high turnout can be a 
danger: high turnout in the last years of the Weimar Republic coincided with election 
successes for the Nazi Party. The danger is that sudden jumps in turnout, in periods of crisis, 
bring to the polls many previously uninterested and uninvolved citizens, who may support 
extremist parties (Tingsten 1937, 225; Lipset 1960, 140–52, 218–19). It seems to me, however, 
that this is an argument for compulsory voting, not against it: instead of trying to keep turnout 
at steady low levels, it is better to safeguard against the danger of sudden sharp increases by 
maintaining steady high levels. 
A practical argument against compulsory voting is that it is difficult, or even impossible, to 
introduce it. “Impossible” is wrong, of course, because many countries have mandatory voting 
right now. “Difficult” is true, and one special difficulty is that proposals for compulsory voting are 
likely to be opposed by conservative parties: mandatory voting is clearly not in their partisan 
self-interest. But remember that most conservative parties were also opposed to universal 
suffrage  – and universal suffrage was eventually accepted anyway.  The need for high and 10 — Arend Lijphart / The Problem of Low and Unequal Voter Turnout — I H S 
relatively equal voting participation is not just a political and partisan question but, ultimately, a 
moral issue. 
The final and most serious argument against mandatory voting is that it may solve, at least 
partially, the conflict between the democratic ideals of participation and equality, but that it 
violates a third democratic ideal: individual freedom. This is really not a strong argument either 
– for three reasons: 
First, remember that the term compulsory voting is a misleading misnomer: it does not entail 
an obligation to actually vote – especially if the law is written in such a way, as it was in the 
Netherlands, that citizens have the right to refuse to accept a ballot. However, even under more 
restrictive rules, the secret ballot guarantees that the right not to vote remains intact. 
Second, mandatory voting entails a truly very small decrease in freedom compared with lots of 
other collective-action problems which democracies solve by imposing legal obligations, such 
as jury duty, the obligation to pay taxes, military service, and compulsory school attendance. 
Thirdly, before we put the right not to vote on too high a pedestal, let us also remember that 
non-voting is a form of free riding  – taking advantage of the benefits of democracy without 
contributing to it – and that free riding of any kind may be rational, but that it is also selfish and 
immoral. 
My conclusion is that none of the arguments against compulsory voting are convincing. On the 
contrary, compulsory voting has strong merit and promise as a method to counteract the 
growing problem of low voter participation and the serious problem of inequality that this 
creates. I H S — Arend Lijphart / The Problem of Low and Unequal Voter Turnout — 11 
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